Appendix 1: Matters Relating to the Inquiry
Contents
Page
A1.1 The conduct of the Inquiry 3
A1.2 Representation before the Inquiry 27
A1.1: The conduct of the Inquiry
Contents
Paragraph
The background to the Inquiry A1.1.1
The Tribunal A1.1.5
Counsel to the Inquiry A1.1.6
Solicitors and Secretaries to the Inquiry A1.1.7
The interested parties A1.1.9
Representation of witnesses A1.1.15
The Attorney General’s undertaking A1.1.16
The Inquiry’s hearings A1.1.17
Counsel’s reports A1.1.24
Anonymity and screening A1.1.28
Venue A1.1.32
Evidence gathered by the Inquiry A1.1.38
Witnesses A1.1.40
Statement-taking A1.1.48
Oral and written evidence A1.1.51
Expert evidence A1.1.53
Private 027 A1.1.56
Operation Apollo A1.1.63
Claims by journalists for the protection of their sources A1.1.68
The Witness Liaison Team A1.1.73
Accommodation for journalists A1.1.75
Additional viewing rooms A1.1.76
Closing submissions A1.1.80
Technology A1.1.84
Cost and length of the Inquiry A1.1.95
The cost of legal representation A1.1.95
Other factors relating to the cost and length of the Inquiry A1.1.97
Archiving A1.1.98
Acknowledgements A1.1.99
The background to the Inquiry
A1.1.1 On 31st January 1972 the then Home Secretary announced that a public inquiry would be held into the events of the preceding day, which has become known as “Bloody Sunday”. Lord Widgery, the Lord Chief Justice of England, conducted the inquiry and his report was published on 19th April 1972.1 Many people, including those whose relatives had died and those who were wounded on that day, rejected his conclusions. Over the years, some of these people campaigned, with others, for a new public inquiry. New material relating to the events of Bloody Sunday came to light. This material included eyewitness accounts (made available to Lord Widgery but not, during the course of his inquiry, made public) and the results of media investigations, including a newspaper report and a Channel 4 television interview, which featured a new and disturbing account from a former member of 1 PARA about the actions of the Army. That soldier became known to this Inquiry as Private 027, which was the cipher allocated to him by the Widgery Inquiry. New interpretations of ballistics evidence and new medical evidence also became available.
1 Widgery Report, Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day, HL101, HC220, London: HMSO, 1972.
A1.1.2 In 1997 Professor Dermot Walsh wrote a report entitled “The Bloody Sunday Tribunal of Inquiry. A Resounding Defeat for Truth, Justice and the Rule of Law”, in which he analysed the statements made by soldiers to the Royal Military Police (RMP) and to the Treasury Solicitor following the events of Bloody Sunday. These statements were not made available to counsel for the next of kin at the Widgery Inquiry but were released for public inspection in the summer of 1996. Professor Walsh concluded that the statements contained substantial and material inconsistencies, discrepancies and alterations.
A1.1.3 In 1997 the Irish Government called for a new public inquiry and, in support of that call, submitted a dossier to the United Kingdom Government. The dossier included an analysis of the new material and a consideration both of Professor Walsh’s report and of the critique by Professor Samuel Dash of Lord Widgery’s findings, published in June 1972 by The Defence and Education Fund of the International League for the Rights of Man, in association with the National Council for Civil Liberties. The Irish Government argued that Lord Widgery’s findings could not be supported.
A1.1.4 The United Kingdom Government considered that the weight of material available at this point was such as to require a re-examination of events. Accordingly, the Prime Minister, The Rt Hon Tony Blair MP, announced on 29th January 1998 the setting up of an inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Inquiries Act 2005, but by virtue of section 44(5) of that Act the repeal did not affect powers conferred or duties imposed on the Tribunal under earlier legislation.
The Tribunal
A1.1.5 There were three members of the Tribunal. It was chaired by The Rt Hon the Lord Saville of Newdigate. The Hon William Hoyt OC (formerly Chief Justice of New Brunswick, Canada) and The Rt Hon Sir Edward Somers (a former member of the Court of Appeal of New Zealand) were appointed as members of the Tribunal in February 1998. Sir Edward Somers resigned in June 2000 for health reasons and later died. He was replaced in September 2000 by The Hon John Toohey AC (a former Justice of the High Court of Australia). The Hon William Esson, then a serving member of the Court of Appeal of British Columbia, Canada, was appointed a reserve member of the Tribunal. He resigned from the Inquiry on health grounds in August 2001.
Counsel to the Inquiry
A1.1.6 The Tribunal approved Lord Saville’s appointment of Christopher Clarke QC (now The Hon Mr Justice Christopher Clarke) as Counsel to the Inquiry. Alan Roxburgh and, later, Jacob Grierson were appointed as Junior Counsel. On Jacob Grierson’s resignation in June 2000, Cathryn McGahey and Bilal Rawat joined the Inquiry as Junior Counsel.
Solicitors and Secretaries to the Inquiry
A1.1.7 Philip Ridd, then a senior legal adviser to the Inland Revenue, was appointed as the first Solicitor to the Inquiry. He was succeeded by John Tate who appointed Gordon Dickinson as his deputy. Gordon Dickinson subsequently became Solicitor to the Inquiry.
A1.1.8 Ann Stephenson, a senior administrator from the Department of Health, was the first Secretary to the Inquiry. She was succeeded by Adrian Shaw, then by Christine Pulford and, finally, by Elizabeth Johnson.
The interested parties
A1.1.9 The Tribunal granted interested party status to most of those wounded on Bloody Sunday, to the families of the deceased and to soldiers who were present on the day or had relevant evidence to give about it. Those with interested party status were entitled to be legally represented throughout the Inquiry’s hearings.
A1.1.10 A more limited form of interested party status was granted to former members of the Executive Committee of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), who organised the march on 30th January 1972, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), now the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), certain former republican paramilitaries and to a person wounded on Bloody Sunday, who elected to participate in the Inquiry at a late stage. Those with limited party status were entitled to be represented during those parts of the hearings that were directly relevant to them.
A1.1.11 Representatives of the Irish Government and of British Irish Rights Watch were invited to be present as observers throughout the hearings. Representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) attended when arguments or evidence relevant to this department of state were heard.
A1.1.12 The Tribunal decided that those with interested party status and limited party status should be able, through their legal representatives, to question witnesses. The Tribunal members recognised from an early stage that if such questioning were not permitted, the families of those who had died, and the wounded, would have no confidence in the Inquiry; several of them would almost certainly have declined to co-operate with it. Many soldiers faced allegations of serious wrongdoing, including murder; it was clearly right that they should be legally represented throughout the proceedings. The Tribunal members were aware that in some other inquiries it had been the practice for Counsel to the Inquiry to conduct all the questioning, in some instances being provided with questions by interested parties. For the present Inquiry, this was impracticable, given the controversial nature of the events being investigated. It would have been wholly unfair and unworkable for just one barrister to question, say, a soldier accused of firing a fatal shot, attempting to give him an opportunity to tell his side of the story, and then (on behalf of his alleged victim) suggesting that his account was untrue.
A1.1.13 The Tribunal is in no doubt that its decisions to grant interested party status and to permit questioning on behalf of parties were correct. It was essential that all parties had confidence in the Inquiry and that they knew that they were able to explore fully the events of 30th January 1972. The parties made substantial efforts to avoid duplication of questions; although seven separate teams of solicitors and counsel represented the families of the deceased and wounded, and four legal teams represented the soldiers, it was common for only two or three counsel on behalf of the interested parties to question a witness. It was not possible to limit legal representation to one team for the soldiers and another team for the families, because of conflicts of interest and the like between the individuals concerned.
A1.1.14 Further details of the representation of the various parties are contained in part 2 of this appendix.
Representation of witnesses
A1.1.15 Certain witnesses who had particularly controversial evidence to give were also permitted to be represented while they gave evidence and, in some cases, while evidence was given that related to them. Their legal representatives were, with the permission of the Tribunal, able to ask questions, both of their own clients and of those witnesses who gave evidence relating to their clients.
The Attorney General’s undertaking
A1.1.16 The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921 gave witnesses before a public inquiry the right to refuse to answer questions on the basis that they may incriminate themselves. The Tribunal took the view that its search for the truth would be hampered considerably were witnesses to this Inquiry to exercise that right. In order to deal with this potential difficulty, the Tribunal obtained from the Attorney General on 23rd February 1999 an undertaking that no evidence given by a witness before this Inquiry would be used against that witness in any criminal proceedings. In March 2002 the undertaking was clarified to confirm that it extended to evidence relating not just to the events of 30th January 1972 itself, but to all evidence relevant to the events of that day. The giving of the undertaking meant that the risk of self-incrimination could not arise and, therefore, that no witness would be entitled to rely on the privilege against self-incrimination as a reason for refusing to answer a question.
The Inquiry’s hearings
A1.1.17 The Inquiry opened with a formal hearing on 3rd April 1998. In his opening statement the Chairman emphasised that the purpose of the Inquiry was to establish what had happened on Bloody Sunday; the Inquiry would not be sitting as a court of appeal from the Widgery Inquiry nor would it be an investigation into the way in which that earlier inquiry had been conducted. He invited anyone who had relevant material or evidence to give to contact the Secretary to the Inquiry.
A1.1.18 The Chairman made it clear that the Inquiry was to be inquisitorial, not adversarial: the Tribunal’s task was to find the truth, not to decide any issue in favour of one party or another. It was for the Inquiry, not the interested parties, to take the initiative in seeking relevant material and in identifying those witnesses who should be called.
A1.1.19 He stressed that the Inquiry was to be as open as possible and that all those who provided information to the Inquiry could expect to see their information made public. The Tribunal adhered to this principle throughout the course of the Inquiry. All relevant material was made available to the parties and public, unless publication might endanger someone’s safety or publication was not possible for reasons of public interest, such as a risk to national security.
A1.1.20 The text of the opening statement can be found on the Inquiry’s website at
www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org and in Appendix 2.
A1.1.21 Further preliminary hearings took place in 1998 and 1999. On 27th March 2000, Counsel to the Inquiry began to deliver an opening speech in which he summarised the principal issues that were expected to arise and gave an outline of the evidence that had, by that stage, been gathered and that related to those issues. The opening speech lasted for 40 sitting days.
A1.1.22 The interested parties made brief opening statements in November 2000. On 28th November 2000 the first of the Inquiry’s witnesses were called. Oral evidence was heard on a total of 367 days.
A1.1.23 The Inquiry sat for 444 days between 20th July 1998 and 27th January 2005.
Counsel’s reports
A1.1.24 In 1998 and 1999 Counsel to the Inquiry produced three reports, which were distributed to the interested parties. The reports contained analyses of the evidence available at that time to the Inquiry and identified the central issues that, in their view, needed to be considered by the Tribunal.
A1.1.25 The first report analysed the evidence given to the Widgery Inquiry and attempted to identify common ground and contentious issues.
A1.1.26 The second report considered the statements made and the oral evidence given in 1972 by each of the 21 members of 1 PARA who said that he had fired live rounds on Bloody Sunday. Each soldier had made at least one statement to the RMP and one to the Treasury Solicitor and had given oral evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. The second report contained an analysis of the discrepancies (if any) in the accounts that each soldier had given in his various statements and oral evidence.
A1.1.27 The third report compared the accounts given by all of the soldiers whose evidence was available to the Widgery Inquiry. The three reports can be viewed on the Inquiry’s website.
Anonymity and screening
A1.1.28 At an early stage an application was made to the Tribunal on behalf of soldiers and former soldiers that military witnesses other than senior officers should be granted anonymity. The basis of the application was that the safety of these witnesses and their families might be put at risk were the witnesses to be identified publicly. The Tribunal was not persuaded that total anonymity was necessary for all soldiers; initially it granted a limited form of anonymity only to those soldiers who had fired live rounds on 30th January 1972, ruling that they should be identified by their surnames alone. Following a judicial review of that ruling, and of a subsequent ruling in which the Tribunal ruled that no soldier should be granted even this limited form of anonymity, the Court of Appeal in London ordered the Tribunal to grant anonymity to all those soldiers who had fired on the day. The Court of Appeal ruled that, once it was accepted (as the Court accepted) that the soldiers had reasonable grounds for believing that their safety would be at risk were they to be named publicly, they should be named only if there were a compelling justification for identifying them. The Court found that no such justification existed. The Tribunal concluded that the Court of Appeal’s reasoning must apply equally to those soldiers who did not fire, whose need for anonymity was not considered by the Court of Appeal. The Tribunal therefore ordered that all soldiers alleged to have played a part on Bloody Sunday should be granted anonymity. In practice, the Inquiry granted anonymity to any soldier who gave evidence to the Inquiry, unless his name was clearly already in the public domain.
A1.1.29 Anonymity was also granted to agents and employees of the Security Service and to paramilitary witnesses. All witnesses seeking anonymity, other than military witnesses, had to apply to the Tribunal for a grant of anonymity and justify the need for it.
A1.1.30 A small number of witnesses applied successfully to be screened from public view while giving their evidence. Such witnesses could be seen by the Tribunal and by lawyers for the Inquiry and for the interested parties. These witnesses could not be seen by members of the public but their evidence could be heard by all those present in the hearing chamber. Some, but not all, of those witnesses were granted anonymity.
A1.1.31 In 2001, a number of former RUC officers, who were not seeking anonymity, applied to be screened while giving oral evidence. Some of the families challenged by way of judicial review the Tribunal’s decision to allow these officers to be screened. The High Court in Northern Ireland, and subsequently the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland, upheld the Tribunal’s decision.
Venue
A1.1.32 The Tribunal initially decided that the majority of oral hearings should take place in Londonderry, this being the place in which the relevant events of 30th January 1972 had occurred. At an early stage it was contemplated that some evidence might be heard in London, if that were the most convenient place for such evidence to be taken.
A1.1.33 The oral evidence of civilian and paramilitary witnesses, RUC officers and Northern Ireland-based politicians was heard in Londonderry. In 2001 an application was made on behalf of some of the soldiers for military evidence to be heard in Great Britain. The basis of the application was the submission that the soldiers’ lives would be at risk were they to give evidence in Londonderry. In August 2001 the Tribunal rejected that application, taking the view that there was no such risk. Following a judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision, the Court of Appeal in London ruled that the soldiers would be at risk in Londonderry and that they should not give their evidence there. The Tribunal decided that the military evidence should instead be heard in London. Subsequently, a number of politicians and members of the security agencies who were based in Great Britain applied successfully to the Tribunal for a ruling that their evidence should also be heard in London.
A1.1.34 The venue selected in Londonderry was the Guildhall, the city’s principal civic building. The main chamber of the Guildhall was reorganised and considerably refurbished to accommodate the Inquiry.
A1.1.35 In London, the Tribunal sat at Methodist Central Hall, Westminster. One of the building’s main halls was refurbished and a hearing chamber, very similar to that in Londonderry, was created.
A1.1.36 The Tribunal sat in Londonderry from 20th July 1998 until 19th September 2002 and from 29th October 2003 until 23rd November 2004.
A1.1.37 The Tribunal sat at Central Hall in London from 25th September 2002 until 21st October 2003. A final witness, known as Witness X, was heard on 27th January 2005. By that time, the Inquiry’s hearing chambers in Londonderry and London had been dismantled. The Tribunal sat in Court 36 of the Royal Courts of Justice in London. The witness gave evidence by video link from another location and his evidence was relayed by video and audio link to the Guildhall in Londonderry.
Evidence gathered by the Inquiry
A1.1.38 In total, the Tribunal heard oral evidence from 922 witnesses and read the written accounts of a further 1,562 people. The Inquiry received 110 videotapes and 121 audio tapes. It received thousands of documents, the most important of which were placed in a core bundle and considered in evidence by the Tribunal. The material within the core bundle was divided into 33 categories and filled about 160 lever-arch files. Copies of the core bundle were supplied to the interested parties. The remaining material obtained by the Inquiry was determined to be of insufficient relevance for it to be considered by the Tribunal as part of the evidence placed before it. However, the vast majority of this material was distributed to the interested parties who were free to argue that any document within it was relevant and should be taken into account by the Tribunal. As a result, some additional material was added to the core bundle. A small quantity of material was the subject of successful applications by state agencies for non-disclosure to the parties or public on grounds of public interest immunity. Some of these documents were made public in redacted form and added to the core bundle. Others could not be disclosed at all.
A1.1.39 The material obtained included written statements given by civilians shortly after Bloody Sunday to interviewers acting on behalf of NICRA. It also included tape recordings of interviews from that time. On the evening of Bloody Sunday, members of the Derry City branch of NICRA arranged for a visiting American film researcher, Kathleen Keville, to take statements from civilians who had witnessed the events of that afternoon. Ms Keville had an audio tape recorder with her; on the night of 30th January 1972 and over the following few days, she and others used the machine to record about 150 interviews. Solicitors representing NICRA before this Inquiry succeeded in tracing Ms Keville, who had returned to America. She had retained the original tape recordings and made them available to the Inquiry. Witnesses were therefore able to hear the accounts that they had given in 1972. Transcripts of these accounts were made available to the parties and some of the tapes were played during the course of the Inquiry’s hearings.
Witnesses
A1.1.40 The tracing and interviewing of witnesses was a lengthy and difficult process. The Inquiry had to seek to identify those, both members of the security forces and civilians, who had been present on Bloody Sunday and who it appeared might have useful evidence to give about the events of that day.
A1.1.41 The Inquiry was assisted by the availability of records from the Widgery Inquiry (from which it could identify witnesses who had given evidence to that inquiry) and by the statements taken from civilians by NICRA shortly after Bloody Sunday. In Londonderry, appeals were made through the local media for witnesses to come forward. Solicitors representing the wounded and the families of those who had died on the day helped significantly, both in identifying potential witnesses and in encouraging them to co-operate with the Inquiry.
A1.1.42 The PSNI (formerly the RUC) assisted the Inquiry in its efforts to trace police officers who had been in Londonderry on the day.
A1.1.43 The MoD provided as much information as it could about soldiers who were, or were believed to have been, present in Londonderry on Bloody Sunday. In many cases, the soldiers concerned had left the Army and the MoD had lost contact with them. The Inquiry engaged tracing agents who were largely successful in locating witnesses, both civilian and military, for whom the Inquiry had initially had no up-to-date contact details. Police forces within England and Wales also assisted in the tracing process.
A1.1.44 The Inquiry sought evidence from others, particularly politicians, civil servants and agents or employees of the security services, who were not present on Bloody Sunday but might be expected to have valuable evidence to give in respect of it. These individuals were usually readily identifiable from the records maintained by the relevant government departments.
A1.1.45 The Inquiry also needed evidence from those who were republican paramilitaries in 1972. The security services made available records that enabled the Inquiry to identify individuals believed to have been members of the Official IRA, Provisional IRA or Na Fianna Éireann in January 1972. Other republican paramilitaries came forward voluntarily. The Inquiry identified a total of 82 paramilitary witnesses, of whom 52 co-operated to the extent to which they were asked to do so. Fourteen could not be located and nine were unable to assist for medical or compelling personal reasons. Seven refused to co-operate. Of these, two lived outside the jurisdiction. Four were considered to have potential evidence of insufficient importance to justify the issue of witness summonses. The remaining potential witness, Martin Doherty (PIRA 9), was served with a witness summons and refused to comply with it. He was subsequently sentenced by the Belfast High Court to three months’ imprisonment for contempt of the Tribunal.
A1.1.46 The Inquiry traced, or attempted to trace, approximately 6,500 potential witnesses. Some, on being contacted, turned out to have no relevant evidence to give. It proved impossible to locate others. Many were confirmed as dead or too unwell to give evidence. However, statements were taken from nearly 2,000 people.
A1.1.47 The evidence of those who could not be interviewed was not entirely lost in all cases since a proportion of them had made statements in the past to NICRA or to journalists and some had given evidence to the Widgery Inquiry. Records of the accounts of these witnesses remained available to the Tribunal and were taken into account by the Tribunal.
Statement-taking
A1.1.48 The Inquiry, after inviting and considering tenders for the task, engaged Eversheds LLP, a firm of solicitors with offices throughout England and Wales, to take witness statements. Representatives from Eversheds worked in Londonderry and travelled throughout the United Kingdom, taking the vast majority of the statements required by the Inquiry. Eversheds made in our view successful use of the cognitive interviewing technique, in which witnesses’ recall was enhanced by encouraging them to recount several times their experiences of the day. In almost all cases, the witnesses remembered significantly more details as they went over the events for a second or third time.
A1.1.49 As Solicitor and Deputy Solicitor to the Inquiry, John Tate and Gordon Dickinson, both senior civil servants, took responsibility for interviewing witnesses who lived abroad. They travelled to various countries including Australia, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong and Zimbabwe. Solicitors from Eversheds were sent to Kosovo to interview an Army officer serving there.
A1.1.50 Although the majority of statements were obtained in the early years of the Inquiry, statement-taking continued, as more witnesses came forward or were identified, until 2004.
Oral and written evidence
A1.1.51 Counsel to the Inquiry made the initial recommendations as to which witnesses should be called to give oral evidence. The Tribunal then reviewed those recommendations and made decisions as to those witnesses who should be called and those whose evidence should be read. A witness was called to give oral evidence if the evidence was or was likely to be controversial or if the Tribunal thought that through giving oral evidence the witness might be able to provide further assistance, beyond the information set out in the witness statement. The Tribunal read the written statements of those who were not called to give oral evidence and took those statements into account when it came to make its findings.
A1.1.52 The parties were given lists of those whose evidence was to be read and were invited to identify from those lists any witnesses whom they wished to be called to give oral evidence. Where the Tribunal was persuaded that witnesses might be able to provide further assistance, the Tribunal acceded to the parties’ requests for them to be called.
Expert evidence
A1.1.53 The Tribunal determined at an early stage that it would commission its own reports from experts and would not generally accept reports obtained by interested parties. The Inquiry obtained expert evidence from two historians on the historical context of Bloody Sunday. It also obtained expert assistance to enhance photographs and tape recordings. Attempts were made to determine whether a listener could identify and distinguish the sounds made by various types of weapons and nail bombs. The parties were invited to attend a demonstration at which weapons in use in 1972 were fired.
A1.1.54 A ballistics expert, a pathologist and an expert in firearms and explosives residue were engaged to analyse the pathology reports and scientific evidence collated in 1972 and to provide their own conclusions, as far as they were able to do so, upon this material. A report was also obtained from an expert in the construction of nail bombs. An expert from HM Nautical Almanac Office analysed a series of photographs taken on Bloody Sunday and, through examination of the shadows on the photographs, was able to provide a report on the sequence in which the photographs were taken.
A1.1.55 The Inquiry appointed a Peer Review Panel, consisting of three experts with a background in forensic science, to review the work of some of the Inquiry’s experts. The report of the Peer Review Panel dated 24th May 2000 may be viewed on the Inquiry’s website, www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.
Private 027
A1.1.56 The Tribunal also had to consider the taking of evidence from Private 027, the former member of 1 PARA whose “revelations” formed part of the case for a new Inquiry. It was apparent to the Tribunal from the outset that if Private 027 were either to give evidence voluntarily or be compelled to do so, his was likely to be evidence of the utmost importance. If he were to confirm the account attributed to him in the documents submitted to the Irish Government, his evidence would implicate a number of individuals in grave wrongdoing. If on the other hand he were to withdraw the earlier account or deny its authenticity, the allegations based upon that account might be exposed as false.
A1.1.57 Solicitors acting for Private 027 contacted the Inquiry in April 1998. They informed the Inquiry that their client was willing in principle to make a witness statement and give oral evidence, but was concerned about his personal security, and would not co-operate until arrangements acceptable to him had been made for his protection against any reprisals that might be attempted. The Inquiry, through his solicitors, invited Private 027 to make a formal application to the Tribunal for whatever special measures he considered necessary. However, he declined to do so, adopting the position that it was for the Inquiry to make suitable proposals to him and not vice versa.
A1.1.58 Where a witness with relevant evidence to give refuses to co-operate save on his own terms, the Tribunal would normally be able to issue and serve a witness summons. However, the Inquiry did not know Private 027’s whereabouts and he was not prepared to reveal them. His solicitors informed the Inquiry that they themselves did not know the address at which he was residing.
A1.1.59 The Inquiry therefore made extensive efforts over a period of many months during 1999 to locate Private 027. The services of an experienced tracing agent were employed. Summonses were served on a number of utility companies and other organisations for the production of records that might have shown where he was to be found. After exhaustive searches it proved impossible to discover his current address. It appeared to the Inquiry that he had moved several times and that he had probably taken effective steps to put himself beyond reach of a summons.
A1.1.60 In these exceptional circumstances, the Tribunal was obliged to consider whether an agreement should be reached with Private 027’s solicitors to secure his voluntary co-operation or whether the Inquiry should proceed without his evidence. The Tribunal accepted that the fear of reprisals expressed by this witness was genuine and reasonable. After the most careful consideration, the Tribunal concluded that the proper fulfilment of its terms of reference required that every reasonable effort should be made to obtain his evidence, including, if necessary, arranging for the provision of appropriate measures for his personal protection. The Tribunal accordingly invited the Northern Ireland Office to consider whether it would be appropriate for public funds to be expended on the provision of measures to secure Private 027’s personal safety. This culminated in an agreement made between the Northern Ireland Office and Private 027 on 6th July 2000 in which certain measures were put in place.1
1 B1565.100-105. Parts of the agreement have been redacted for security reasons.
A1.1.61 In order to save time Private 027 attended an interview with Eversheds, and a draft statement was prepared for his signature, before the agreement was concluded. It was therefore possible for him to sign the witness statement immediately after the agreement was finalised. The members of the Tribunal did not see the draft statement while the consultations were continuing.
A1.1.62 The Tribunal required that it should be a provision of the agreement that it would be free to make public all terms agreed with Private 027, save in so far as this would compromise his personal security. A memorandum setting out the position was sent to all interested parties by the Solicitor to the Inquiry in August 2000.1
Operation Apollo
A1.1.63 Immediately after Bloody Sunday, 29 of the rifles that had been used by members of 1 PARA on that day were submitted to the Department of Industrial and Forensic Science (DIFS) in Northern Ireland for ballistics testing. Twenty-eight of these were 7.62mm self-loading rifles (SLRs) and the 29th was probably a converted .303in sniper rifle. In September 1999 the Inquiry asked the MoD for any information that it could provide about whether the rifles still existed. The MoD succeeded in identifying five SLRs that were believed to have been among the 28 and that were still in its possession but which were subject to a destruction programme. Although an order forbidding the destruction of these rifles was issued by the MoD, two of the rifles were destroyed before they could be examined by the Inquiry.
A1.1.64 An investigation into the destruction of the rifles was undertaken jointly by the MoD Police and West Mercia Constabulary and was code-named Operation Apollo. The investigators concluded that the destruction had occurred as a result of negligence. No criminal proceedings were instituted as a result of this incident.
A1.1.65 The Operation Apollo team, as well as investigating the loss of two rifles, made enquiries to try to locate others. A total of 14 rifles were located, of which 13 were SLRs and one was a converted .303in sniper rifle.
A1.1.66 However, it transpired that a record was made in 1972 of only the last part of the serial number of each of the 28 SLRs submitted for examination. It was therefore impossible to say, even in respect of the 13 SLRs recovered, that these were definitely the ones in use on Bloody Sunday. The Operation Apollo team demonstrated that it was likely that the same final digits were allocated twice, once to each of the two companies that manufactured SLRs. The first part of the serial number, unavailable to the Inquiry in the case of the 28 SLRs, identified the manufacturer. The Operation Apollo team concluded that the .303in sniper rifle sent to DIFS in 1972 had a unique number. This rifle was located in Germany but no useful scientific evidence was obtained from it.
A1.1.67 In the event, the Inquiry’s inability to trace and examine the 29 rifles turned out to cause no disadvantage to the Inquiry. The Inquiry’s ballistics expert, Kevin O’Callaghan, concluded that the lack of ballistics evidence from 1972 (including the absence of most of the bullets known to have been fired), coupled with the likelihood that the rifles had been used, refurbished or re-barrelled over the years, would have made useful ballistics evidence impossible to obtain.
Claims by journalists for the protection of their sources
A1.1.68 Many journalists had, over the years, conducted investigations into the events of Bloody Sunday and had interviewed individuals who could provide information about that day. In some instances, an individual had spoken to a journalist on condition that the journalist would not reveal that person’s name. When asked by the Inquiry to reveal the names of their sources, a number of journalists refused to do so, relying on the statutory protection afforded journalists under the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
A1.1.69 This statutory protection is subject to the proviso that the court may order disclosure if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice. The Tribunal is given the power of the court to make such an order under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, and during the course of the Inquiry made a number of such orders, giving reasons for doing so.
A1.1.70 In each case of a refusal to identify sources the Tribunal asked the journalist to contact his source and to seek permission to reveal the source’s name. The Inquiry also made efforts, where possible, to identify the source by other means. In many instances, the names of the sources were discovered without the journalists to whom the sources had spoken having to reveal the names.
A1.1.71 A journalist from the Daily Telegraph, Toby Harnden, wrote an article based on information provided to him by a soldier whose name Toby Harnden had promised to keep confidential. The Tribunal regarded the information as important and was initially unable to identify the soldier by any other means. On Toby Harnden’s refusal to reveal the name of his source, the Tribunal, exercising its power under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, referred him to the High Court in Belfast for contempt. Later, the soldier (who was an existing Inquiry witness and who through his solicitor had previously denied being the source) admitted having spoken to Toby Harnden. The proceedings against Toby Harnden were discontinued.
A1.1.72 The Tribunal ordered another two journalists to disclose the names of four soldiers who had spoken to the journalists and whom the Tribunal could not by other means identify. The journalists refused to do so. Their employer at the relevant time, Independent Television News (ITN), also refused to obey an order to produce to the Tribunal documents in ITN’s possession that would identify these soldiers. The Inquiry subsequently succeeded in identifying two of the soldiers. The Tribunal did not pursue contempt proceedings against the journalists or ITN, taking the view that no useful purpose would be served by such action.
The Witness Liaison Team
A1.1.73 The Inquiry was conscious that many witnesses, for a variety of reasons, were likely to be nervous or anxious about giving oral evidence. Arrangements were made to make the experience of attendance before the Tribunal as comfortable as possible. Both the Guildhall in Londonderry and the Central Hall in London were equipped with witness waiting rooms, which were not accessible to the public. A member of the Inquiry’s staff was responsible for meeting and looking after each witness. Each of the witness waiting rooms contained a replica of the computer screen used by witnesses while giving evidence. Each witness was shown how documents were displayed on the computer screen and was also shown how to mark documents on the screen while giving evidence, if this was needed.
A1.1.74 Members of the Inquiry’s Witness Liaison Team were responsible, with Junior Counsel to the Inquiry, for timetabling the attendance of witnesses. Some witnesses gave evidence for several days; others for an hour or less. The Witness Liaison Team made travel arrangements, organised the payment of expenses and attempted to ensure that each witness suffered as little inconvenience as possible.
Accommodation for journalists
A1.1.75 A press centre was made available to journalists attending the Guildhall in Londonderry and the Central Hall in London. Each press centre was equipped with a closed-circuit television (CCTV) link, which enabled journalists to view and hear the proceedings in the chamber. The Inquiry’s press officers were on hand to assist with queries; as each witness began his or her oral evidence, the press officers distributed to journalists copies of any written statements made by that witness. Transcripts of the day’s proceedings were made available to journalists at the end of each day.
Additional viewing rooms
A1.1.76 The chamber within the Guildhall in Londonderry had two public galleries. A total of about 150 people could be accommodated within the galleries. Parts of the galleries were set aside for the use of “the families”, that is the wounded and relatives of those who had died on Bloody Sunday. The Inquiry could not predict with any certainty the numbers of members of the public who would wish to attend the Inquiry’s hearings. It was inevitable that attendance would increase when high-profile witnesses gave evidence. The Inquiry was also conscious that family members might well wish not to attend the hearing chamber if distressing evidence was to be given, but might still wish to follow the proceedings from a more private room.
A1.1.77 In order to accommodate additional members of the public in Londonderry, the Inquiry rented the Rialto cinema, a short distance from the Guildhall. A CCTV link allowed anyone in the Rialto to view and hear the proceedings then going on in the chamber. The Rialto was, in the event, little used, and eventually the Inquiry ceased to rent it.
A1.1.78 A CCTV link was also established to the families’ room within the Guildhall. This was a room below the hearing chamber to which only the families and their guests had access. The proceedings could also be viewed and heard through a CCTV link to the offices of the Bloody Sunday Trust, a group that had campaigned over the years for an inquiry, with which many family members were associated and whose premises were very near to the Guildhall.
A1.1.79 In London, a public gallery that could accommodate 98 people was constructed at the back of the hearing chamber. A separate gallery was provided for the families. No additional public viewing space was provided or needed.
Closing submissions
A1.1.80 At the conclusion of the evidence, the interested parties and those with limited party status were invited to make written submissions as to the findings that the Tribunal should make. The written submissions of each party were made available to all other parties. Each party was then invited to submit a written reply to the submissions made by the others.
A1.1.81 After the exchange of submissions and replies, the Tribunal held brief oral hearings in which each party was entitled to make a short statement. The Tribunal took the opportunity to put questions to some of the interested parties.
A1.1.82 Counsel to the Inquiry then made lengthy written submissions, analysing the interested parties’ submissions and identifying the issues that Counsel believed that the Tribunal should consider. Finally, in the course of a two-day hearing, Counsel to the Inquiry made oral closing submissions.
A1.1.83 The written submissions of the parties and Counsel to the Inquiry totalled 14,139 pages. They were presented in electronic as well as paper form. The electronic versions contained hypertext linking, so that the reader had only to click on the reference to a document or transcript in order to view that piece of evidence instantly on the screen.
Technology
A1.1.84 The Inquiry made substantial use of information technology.
A1.1.85 The material obtained by the Inquiry was supplied in electronic form to the interested parties. During the course of the hearings, witnesses were not usually asked to consult paper documents; each relevant document was instead displayed on a monitor in the witness box. Monitors in front of all Tribunal members and lawyers showed the same material. The system used was called TrialPro II.
A1.1.86 The photograph below shows the hearing chamber in the Guildhall in Londonderry. Two large screens, suspended from the ceiling, can be seen at the top of the photograph. These screens faced the public galleries. One screen was used to display documents, giving members of the public the same view as that of the Tribunal members and lawyers. The second screen showed a video image of the person speaking in the chamber. The cameras in the chamber switched automatically to film the current speaker, whether Tribunal member, lawyer or witness.
A1.1.87 Similar screens, one showing the person speaking and another showing whatever document was being considered, were located in the Inquiry’s offices in Londonderry, the press room, the families’ room, the Bloody Sunday Trust building and (until March 2002) the Rialto cinema. When the Inquiry moved to London, the proceedings were relayed to all the screens in Londonderry.
A1.1.88 Laptop computers were available to the Tribunal members and lawyers. The proceedings were recorded using the LiveNote system, in which a stenographer took down the words spoken and a transcript showing those words appeared on the laptop screens within seconds. It was possible for the Tribunal members and lawyers to annotate the transcript on the screen during the course of the proceedings.
A1.1.89 A printed version of each day’s proceedings was made available within two hours of the end of each sitting day. An electronic version was posted daily on the Inquiry’s website. The Inquiry’s proceedings were also recorded on audio tape. Those preparing the daily transcripts were able to refer to the day’s tapes, ensuring that accurate transcripts were produced even of passages that the stenographer had found difficulty in recording.
A1.1.90 One of the practical difficulties faced by the Inquiry was the fact that the area of Londonderry in which the shooting took place looked very different in 1998 from the way that it had looked in 1972. In particular, the Rossville Flats, the three blocks of which had dominated the area in 1972, had been demolished. In order to deal with this problem, the Inquiry arranged for the creation of a virtual reality model of the relevant part of the city. This electronic model contained a photographic panorama of the Bogside as it was in the late 1990s. However, the user could switch to another version in which artists’ impressions of the buildings that had been present in 1972 had been superimposed on the modern panorama. The virtual reality model was used to assist many witnesses. They could use it to identify particular locations and could also, using a stylus on the screen, mark “still” versions of the panorama with arrows or lines in order to pinpoint a particular place. The marked versions could then be preserved for future reference. When in use, the virtual reality images were displayed on the public screens.
A1.1.91 The Tribunal considered that the use of information technology was of significant value to the Inquiry. It was undoubtedly far quicker for a witness, and all those present in the chamber, to be shown a document on a screen than for everyone present to be asked to reach for a paper bundle and find the relevant page. Research was made easier for lawyers, since the electronic transcripts could be searched for key words and phrases far more swiftly and accurately than paper transcripts.
A1.1.92 The use of information technology enabled the public to have far greater access to the Inquiry’s work than would otherwise have been possible. Members of the public were able to see on the public screens the documents that were being shown to witnesses; they would not have been able to do so had paper copies been used. The use of CCTV relays also meant that people could follow the proceedings without having to be present in the hearing chamber. For those without access to any of the places to which the proceedings were broadcast, the website provided, each evening, an update of the day’s proceedings.
A1.1.93 The members of the Tribunal made extensive use of information technology when preparing this report. Each used a desktop computer with two monitors, enabling him to view two documents at the same time with ease. In addition, each was provided with a laptop computer on which LiveNote and TrialPro II were stored. Since all relevant documents were available electronically, the members of the Tribunal were able to work outside the Inquiry’s London office, a useful feature when two members of the Tribunal came from other jurisdictions.
A1.1.94 Some of the information technology systems used by this Inquiry were subsequently used in the Shipman Inquiry, the inquest into the Omagh bombings, the ongoing inquiries in Northern Ireland and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International litigation.
Cost and length of the Inquiry
The cost of legal representation
A1.1.95 Legal representation added very substantially indeed to the cost of the Inquiry and was the major item of expense. The Tribunal, however, was and remains of the view that for this Inquiry, the legal representation provided for the interested parties and others was essential. In a public inquiry into the death and injury of people at the hands of state agencies, justice in a democratic society demands, in our view, that the families of those killed, and those injured, together with the agents of the State or others said to be directly or indirectly responsible, should be entitled to legal representation, so as to ensure that their rights and interests are fully protected.
A1.1.96 The Tribunal made every effort to ensure that money was not needlessly expended. The levels of remuneration for the lawyers involved were kept in line with those normally allowed for matters of the present kind.
Other factors relating to the cost and length of the Inquiry
A1.1.97 Despite the use of information technology, the Inquiry has been lengthy and costly. Many factors have contributed to this. The fact that the scope of the Inquiry could not in our view be limited to the few minutes during which people were killed and wounded on Bloody Sunday and our need to hear almost 1,000 witnesses and read the statements of another 1,500 were two of the factors, to which was added the vast amount of documentary and other material relevant to Bloody Sunday. Other factors included the separate representation of various interest groups where we were persuaded that this was required in the interests of justice; and the requirement to redact countless documents to ensure anonymity. In addition, the Tribunal had to deal with many public interest immunity applications and applications that the Tribunal should not order the disclosure of journalists’ sources of information. There were various judicial reviews and some subsequent appeals. The length and cost of the Inquiry was further increased by moving the sittings from Londonderry to London and back to Londonderry, in consequence of an order by the Court of Appeal.
Archiving
A1.1.98 The object of archiving has been to ensure the preservation of the vital and valuable records of the Inquiry. Principal among these are the documentary evidence, witness statements, transcripts of the Inquiry hearings and Tribunal rulings. Records of enduring value will in due course be transferred to The National Archives to ensure long-term preservation and public access.
Acknowledgements
A1.1.99 The Tribunal is grateful for the assistance that it received from many quarters. We should record that members of the PSNI (formerly the RUC), the Security Service, the MoD and other state agencies did considerable work in searching their archives to identify and make available to the Inquiry material relating to the events of Bloody Sunday. We recognise that very considerable effort was required to locate this material, without which the Tribunal would not have been able to complete its task.
A1.1.100 The Tribunal could not have undertaken and completed its work without the commitment and assistance of our Counsel and our professional and administrative staff. We mention our Counsel again – Christopher Clarke QC (now The Hon Mr Justice Christopher Clarke), Alan Roxburgh, Cathryn McGahey and Bilal Rawat – and our historical and research consultant Matthew Hill. It is impossible properly to describe their dedication to the Inquiry, their grasp of the material and their continuing contributions. Throughout they acted scrupulously in not seeking to influence the Tribunal in reaching its decisions, while providing us with invaluable assistance in collating and summarising the evidence and materials for our consideration. We would also mention Jacob Grierson, who was one of our Counsel during the early part of the Inquiry. Similarly, the Inquiry was exceptionally well served by the solicitors Eversheds, led by Peter Jones. Eversheds performed their enormous task in both a professional and sensitive manner.
A1.1.101 It is, of course, invidious to select for special thanks a few individuals from among the many people engaged by the Inquiry over time. Nevertheless, the Tribunal members would like to record their gratitude to Heather Woodside, the Inquiry’s LiveNote stenographer who, with assistance from Emma Watmore and Adrienne Martin, recorded every word of the proceedings on almost every one of our hundreds of sitting days. We would also like to acknowledge the work of the members of our Witness Liaison Team, Tony Frankson, Drew Hammond, Ian MacMillan and Rob Ells, who arranged the attendance of over 900 witnesses and did their utmost to make the giving of evidence as convenient and comfortable an experience as it could be. We also wish to mention and thank our research assistant, Louisa Aderonmu, for her help over many years.
A1.1.102 The technical staff who organised and operated the computer and sound systems ensured that we were able to make the very best use of the available technology. The companies involved included Fujitsu, Deloitte, Legal Technology, Graphic Data and Michael Kielty Audio. One of the Inquiry’s own staff, Mark Burdon, created and maintained a database that recorded the Inquiry’s correspondence and its dealings with all its witnesses and without which the Inquiry would have struggled to cope. Many of those witnesses would not have been found without the substantial efforts made by our tracing agents, The Risk Advisory Group plc (“TRAG”), to locate them.
A1.1.103 The Tribunal would like to express its thanks to Derek Kinnen of the Northern Ireland Centre for Learning Resources (now of Opsis Limited), who developed the virtual reality model for us, which proved to be of great assistance.
A1.1.104 A number of members of our staff saw the Inquiry through to its completion, namely, Katrina Barr, Christopher Jack (until almost the end), Elizabeth Johnson, Marsha McDermott, Lorraine Murray, Bronwyn Tyson, Salmina De Vry, and finally, but far from least, Valerie Bath, the Chairman’s personal secretary throughout the Inquiry, who took on the additional burden of acting as the secretary for the other members of the Tribunal. We would like to thank them all for their hard work and commitment to the Inquiry.
A1.1.105 The proofreading and production of the report were done by COI, whose work was consistently of the highest standards.
A1.1.106 We are grateful to all those who helped the smooth running of the Inquiry, both in Londonderry and in London, and to the people of Londonderry who welcomed the Inquiry to their city and lived with its presence in their midst for nearly six years.
